Others in the audience noted that the Brazilian case makes Aguinis' thesis harder to uphold: anti-Americanism as a political banner is in decline, one could argue, in proportion to the country's growing economic and political stability. Others pointed out that anti-Americanism has emerged in Latin America at particular historical moments, including when the making and establishment of national identity involved defining the nation against a common enemy.
Finally, it was suggested that, in the Latin American case, feelings towards the United States are often mixed: feelings of distrust exist side by side with a desire to take advantage of the opportunities and examples provided by the United States.
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Show Streaming. Explore More. Democratization in Venezuela: Thoughts on a New Path. Watch Now. Event Sponsor. Tagged Series. Hosted By. In response to that power, they had developed complex, interlocking identities and strategies. Resentment had simmered throughout the nineteenth century, but widespread protests appeared most particularly in response to events from the War of through World War I and throughout the Great Depression, when U.
The peoples of the hemisphere resisted these incursions through guerrilla warfare in the countryside and peaceful protests in the cities. Let us set aside the continuing anti-Americanism of Cuba, whose seemingly eternal leader Fidel Castro gave up power for the first time temporarily in August of These regimes together made up what some called a new leftist consensus and others described as a new populism in Latin America. As a result, the regimes backed policies that would reduce the political or economic power of the United States in the hemisphere.
Such a view suggests that a circle is soon to be completed—or, worse for Washington and Wall Street, that an anti-U. The circle spirals in this manner: through the twentieth century, anti-Americanism has moved its strategic center from marginal non-state actors in the early century, to elite state actors at mid-century, to a new combination of old and new in more recent years: state actors who encompass the socially marginal.
Finding their support in groups ranging from indigenous peoples to Afro- latinos and from the Zapatista towns of Chiapas to the slums of Brazil, new populist regimes may prove to be true representatives of an alliance bearing an essentialist vision of the United States that allows little room for collaboration.
By every measure, it is the most widespread resurgence of popular anti-Americanism ever in Latin America. Public opinion polls from the s to the present tend to solidify this argument and help place the new anti-Americanism in context.
It is possible, therefore, to compare cold War era public opinion with more recent polls. Since Venezuela offers some of the most complete data, and since its responses were largely typical of those of the rest of Latin America, it presents a good case study.
During the cold War, polls of Venezuelan public opinion showed Venezuelans consistently trusting U. Yet these were far below the net favorables of up to 79 during the cold War. The governments of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala and Fidel Castro in Cuba were arguably the most important of these movements because they took control of state resources and turned them against powerful U.
This paper contends that they are, but that they might be even more serious. In the future, Castro may be considered in retrospect to have been a rather moderate anti-American.
Arbenz, Castro, and their peers did not know the U. They also came of age politically under dictatorships or corrupt democracies that were national in their ability to administer and repress, but not nationalistic in their plans for development or social justice. The dictatorial enemy— Jorge Ubico in Guatemala and Fulgencio Batista in Cuba— was one who operated a state whose system of repression was strong and widespread. But, to Arbenz and Castro, the enemy was of their own nation, and anti-Americanism entered the equation more indirectly.
The mission therefore, was to clean out U. The Guatemalan rose to power and popularity through a democratic election in , and therefore felt entitled to push ahead with massive public works programs, indigenous participation in politics, and especially an anti-U.
But Arbenz failed to purge the military, and once it became clear he would not negotiate generous compensations for U. A week later, Arbenz fled into exile. They were far more focused on decisively taking over the state. Militarily, Castro and his companions had the advantage of sharing no border with any other nation. All these takeovers affected the ability of the United States to influence Cuban developments from the inside.
First, he immediately established an alternative dependence on the Soviet Union. This system kept Cuba afloat but also prevented it from diversifying its economy.
While alienating the United States in and , he also effectively shut down all independent media and political organizations. To be sure, the Venezuelan and cuban regimes shared similarities, beginning with their two leaders. Ties between the two countries have included increased trade and, as U. Because Castro ruled over a state as an autocrat, with Marxist ideology and strict communist Party discipline, he largely did not contend with the desires of the majority or identity-based groups such as women or Afro-Cubans though he did relatively little to oppress them.
For Morales, legitimacy came with an absolute majority vote for the presidency in Because the Venezuelan and Bolivian leaders legitimately won the reins of the nation-state, they have seemed more willing to use the state apparatus as a weapon in a contest against the united States. In , while calling for the expulsion of U. From the s to the s, a generation of relatively marginal groups resisted U. This resistance was particularly intense from , when U. The rhetoric of these groups— called sandinistas in Nicaragua, cacos in Haiti, and gavilleros in the Dominican republic —was sincere, but they lacked the means for implementing national unity.
Roads, telephones and telegraphs, sewers, hospitals, and schools would all assure the stability of the central element in modernization, a functional, effective, and efficient government staffed by technocrats. They had to destroy the nation in order to save it.
As the Great Depression sank in upon U. Haitian patience with the marines was at a boiling point. Several anti-state grievances suddenly coincided in this nationwide protest movement: elite students in U.
All of these grievances were rejections of the ways the U. On December 6, , a group of perhaps 1, on horseback threatened to enter the town of Marchaterre, on the outskirts of Aux Cayes.
About twenty marine officers and their local constabularies met the group, panicked, and shot into the crowd. Answering the question requires looking a little more closely at Latin American attitudes and behavior. After all, the U.
Memories are also short. Latin America is an overwhelmingly youthful region, and most people under 40 have no vivid memories or experiences of the U. We find that for most Latin Americans, the more immediate reality is that of international economic exchange with the United States. For Latin American countries, economic exchange with the U. According to political scientists Joseph Nye and William Reed, strong bilateral economic ties between countries promote goodwill between partners by increasing tolerance, mutual trust, and cross-cultural understanding.
For example, in much of Central America, a large number of lower- and middle-class citizens receive remittances from friends and relatives working in the U. Finally, the relative wealth of the U.
Many Latin American consumers see U. It remains the first or second commercial partner for nearly every country in the region. Moreover, even within Latin America, it is those countries that are the closest to the U. The reason why countries that were the most victimized—in Central America and the Caribbean—are the most pro-American is the greater economic interdependence they enjoy with the U. Although advances in technology and policy changes have dramatically lowered the costs of international exchange, physically proximate countries are still more likely to have higher degrees of economic interdependence than distant ones.
Figure 2 shows this to be the case for inter-American economic relations. The scatterplot depicts 18 Latin American countries according to the number of emigrants they send to the U. To the left of the line are nine countries with relatively few emigrants to the U. To the right of the line are nine countries with a relatively large number of emigrants to the U. In short, proximity to the U. View expanded version of the figure.
Figure 3 traces out a third dimension providing evidence for the case that economic exchange with the U. Here is a representation of pro-American attitudes corresponding to countries in Figure 1. On the left side of the scale are countries with a relatively low percentage of pro-American citizens.
Again, the diagonal line provides a clear point of reference. Below it, in the South American countries where migrant and trade volumes to the U. Above the line, in the Caribbean basin, favorability toward the northern colossus runs high.
The one glaring outlier in the region is Mexico.
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